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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No,
vs.
CECIL LOE,
Defendant/Appellant•
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

The statements made by Defendant were not voluntary and

should be suppressed, as they were taken in violation of the
Defendants Constitutional Rights.
2.

The evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction

against the Defendant of a Criminal Homicide, Murder in the
Second Degree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action in which the Defendant was
charged, pursuant Section 76-5-203 of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953 (as amended), with Second Degree Murder.

The matter came on

for trial before the Honorable David E. Roth, sitting with a
jury, on the 9th, 11th, 12th and 15th day of April, 1985.

The

jury convicted Defendant of Second Degree Murder, a First Degree
Felony, and the Defendant was sentenced on the 1st day of May,
1985 to from five years to life in the Utah State Penitentiary.
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The Defendant appealed that conviction to this Court on the 24th
day of May, 1985.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 28, 1985, the defendant, Cecil Loe, and his
friend, George Nielson, spent the day together drinking and
talking. (R.651)

Later that day, at approximately 8:00 p.m., the

two went to the liquor store for more rum. (R. 652, 232)

On the

way back to defendant's house, the two stopped to pick up Donald
Duffy (R. 652) who then returned with them and spent the
remainder of the night with them drinking.

Once they had

returned to the defendant's residence, they drank for some period
of time and talked. (R. 654)

The discussions included comments

about an overweight girlfriend of Donald Duffy's who apparently
Mr. Nielson did not care for. (R. 652)

At some point, the

defendant asked them to stop arguing about this cfirl. (R. 656)
At some time between 11:00 and midnight, the defendant's
girlfriend, Sheila, went to bed and a short time later George
Nielson1s girlfriend, Robyn, went to sleep on the sofa. (R. 655)
The three men then remained in the kitchen of the apartment
playing cards and drinking until approximately 3:30 a.m. when
some arguing broke out between the men. (R. 655)

George Nielson

got up and woke up his girlfriend, Robyn, and the arguing
continued. (R. 657)

Defendant then went into the bedroom

returning with his revolver. (R. 659)
went into the bathroom. (R. 254)

Robyn Anderson got up and

Some minute or two later, shots
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were fired and George Nielson fell to the ground, mortally
wounded. (R. 659)

Robyn Anderson returned to the livingroom and

saw George laying on the floor. (R. 255)

She went to him and

then went outside to call for help. (R. 259)

She did not notice

who in the room was holding the gun. (R. 256)

The defendant's

girlfriend, Sheila Tyler, then came out into the livingroom and
saw the defendant standing in the livingroom by George but she
did not see the gun. (R. 373)

She noticed Don in the kitchen

looking into the livingroom but she did not see the gun in Don's
possession either. (R. 373)

She then went outside after Robyn to

assist in getting necessary help. (R. 376)

The girls went

downstairs to an apartment and telephoned the police. (R. 376)
Shortly thereafter, Don Duffy came down to the lower
apartment carrying a gun and he set it on the coffee table. (R.
426, 378, 379)

Two of the witnesses in the apartment claimed

that Don made the statement, "I am going to tell them that I did
it." (R. 425, 450)
When the police arrived, everyone pointed to the defendant,
Cecil Loe, as the individual who had shot George, although none
of them claimed to have seen the shooting other than Don Duffy.
(R. 672)

The police officer that took the defendant to jail

claimed that the defendant told him that the defendant shot
George Nielson. (R. 593)

At trial, Don Duffy testified that he

saw the defendant shoot George Nielson (R. 528) and defendant
testified that he saw Don Duffy shoot George Nielson. (R. 666)
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The jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder.
From that conviction, defendant appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Defendant contends that the admission into evidence of a
statement made in the presence of Officer Breen was improperly
admitted into evidence on the basis that it was involuntary and
therefore, taken in violation of the Defendant's rights under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Utah.
The Defendant further contends that the State failed to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant was the
individual that committed the murder in this case and that
Defendant had the requisite intent necessary to convict him of a
Second Degree Homicide.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT WERE INVOLUNTARY AND
THEREFORE, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH
AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1 Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah,
provide that an individual in a prosecution has a right against
self-incrimination.

This right has evolved through a number of

decisions by the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme
Court to a point where a criminal Defendant is afforded a
definite and specific right not to be required to give evidence
against himself.
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The most note worthy case, embodying the Court's position
under these provisions of the Constitution, is that of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 16 LED.2d 694 86 SCT. 1602
(1966) .

In this case, the Court prohibited not only the

traditional police interrogation tactics involving violence,
threats or force of coercion, but also prohibited common police
tactics which involved psychological coercion resulting in a
confession against the Defendant's interest.
Numerous cases have been decided since the Miranda decision
which further delineate a Defendant's rights under the
Constitution and furthermore, describe the inherent unreliability
of an involuntary confession.

The Miranda decision invoked the

Fifth Amendment protections to criminal Defendants in custodial
interrogation situations, reasoning that the psychological and
physical coercions, once a Defendant has been taken into custody,
render subsequent confessions or statements against the
Defendantf s interest suspect.
The case at hand presents the Court with a situation that is
less aggravated than the Miranda situation, but is nevertheless,
tainted with unreliable, involuntary statements.

Here, the

Defendant is stopped by police, taken into custody, while still
in or about the Defendant's premises and preliminarily questioned
concerning the events of the evening.

At this point, the

Defendant was cognizant of the fact that an individual had been
shot and killed.

The police actions, including taking the
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Defendant into custody, made it obvious to the Defendant that he
was the prime suspect in the shooting and the promptings of the
police officers elicited a statement from the Defendant which,
under the Miranda1s decision should be suppressed.

The scenario

in this case was further exacerbated by the fact that the
Defendant was in an extremely intoxicated condition at the time
of the statement and the very nature of the statement made by the
Defendant is a valid indication of the involuntary nature of such
statements since a reasonable person in such a situation would
not make an incriminating statement as was alleged here.
In addition, Defendant denies that he made the statements
indicated by the officer.

In the officer's police report, by the

most amazing of coincidences, these alleged statements are not
included.

The officer called this a typographical error but it

stretches the credulity of a reasonable man to imagine that of
all the information contained in the report, these statements,
which make up the more damaging part of the State's case against
the Defendant, are the ones left out of the report.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE, AS PRESENTED AT TRIAL, IS INSUFFICIENT
TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OR CRIMINAL HOMICIDE MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE
Section 76-1-501 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended),
places a burden of proof upon the State of beyond a reasonable
doubt and in the absence of such proof, requires the Defendant be
acquitted.
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Counsel is mindful of this Court's rather strict standards
of review when, in fact, the Court is asked to review the record
to determine the sufficiency of a verdict.

This view is

expressed in State v. Newbold, 581 P.2d 991 (Utah 1972), where
this Court hold "to set aside a jury verdict, evidence must
appear so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that reasonable minds
acting fairly upon it must have entertained reasonable doubt that
the Defendant committed the crime."

(Id. at 972)

In addition, the Court in State v. H o m e , 364 P. 2d 109 (Utah
1961), utilized the following language, that a jury should have
found the testimony of the only witness against the Defendant "so
inherently unprobable as to be unworthy of belief and upon
objective analysis it appears that reasonable minds could not
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty."
(Id. at 112)
In applying this standard of review to the present case, the
jury was faced with a fact situation which showed only two
individuals who were actually present and watching at the time of
the victim's shooting.

One of those individuals was Don Duffy

who testified at the trial, the other individual was the
Defendant.

There was evidence that the Defendant had made

incriminating statements against his best interest and there were
statements and testimony to the fact that Donald Duffy had also
made incriminating statements which were against his best
interest.

There was evidence presented at trial that showed that
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Donald Duffy's description of the events as he claimed to have
seen them were not consistent with the testimony of the other
witnesses who were at the scene at various times.

The

defendant's testimony as to what events took place when George
Nielson was shot do not conflict with testimony given by the
other collateral witnesses.

The testimony shows that the

argument that had taken place through most of the night involved
George Nielson, and Donald Duffy, not the defendant Cecil Loe
which tends to substantiate the defendant's description of what
transpired.

When the police officers arrived at the scene the

collateral witnesses reported to the police that Cecil Loe, the
defendant, had the weapon and shot George Nielson.

At trial,

however, these witnesses state that although they did see Cecil
Loe bring the gun out from his bedroom, they were not present at
the time of the shooting and do not know who had the weapon
either during the shooting or after the shooting.

It is

understandable, therefore, that having seen Cecil Loe bring the
gun from the bedroom that their impression would be that he had
used the weapon against George Neilson and although they did not
see the shooting this explains their responses to the police
officers when they arrived at the scene.

The only person seen

with the gun after the shooting is Donald Duffy.

That fact

combined with the statements he made when he brought the gun down
to the lower apartment show him to be as likely a suspect as the
defendant himself.

Therefore, the evidence shows that a person
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with a reasonable mind and acting fairly in response to the
evidence must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant actually committed the crime as required in the case of
State v, Newbold.

The evidence is no more conclusive that the

defendant Cecil Loe perpetrated this offense against Mr. Neilson
than it is that Donald Duffy actually pulled the trigger.
Therefore, a reasonable mind would be forced to have a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments and a thorough review of
the evidence, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
grant him a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/S

day of August, 1986.
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Attorney for Appellant
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